home / skills / yoanbernabeu / supabase-pentest-skills / supabase-audit-rpc
This skill audits Supabase RPC functions for security issues, testing RLS bypass, SQL injection, and exposure risks to deliver actionable findings.
npx playbooks add skill yoanbernabeu/supabase-pentest-skills --skill supabase-audit-rpcReview the files below or copy the command above to add this skill to your agents.
---
name: supabase-audit-rpc
description: List and test exposed PostgreSQL RPC functions for security issues and potential RLS bypass.
---
# RPC Functions Audit
> š“ **CRITICAL: PROGRESSIVE FILE UPDATES REQUIRED**
>
> You MUST write to context files **AS YOU GO**, not just at the end.
> - Write to `.sb-pentest-context.json` **IMMEDIATELY after each function tested**
> - Log to `.sb-pentest-audit.log` **BEFORE and AFTER each function test**
> - **DO NOT** wait until the skill completes to update files
> - If the skill crashes or is interrupted, all prior findings must already be saved
>
> **This is not optional. Failure to write progressively is a critical error.**
This skill discovers and tests PostgreSQL functions exposed via Supabase's RPC endpoint.
## When to Use This Skill
- To discover exposed database functions
- To test if functions bypass RLS
- To check for SQL injection in function parameters
- As part of comprehensive API security testing
## Prerequisites
- Supabase URL and anon key available
- Tables audit completed (recommended)
## Understanding Supabase RPC
Supabase exposes PostgreSQL functions via:
```
POST https://[project].supabase.co/rest/v1/rpc/[function_name]
```
Functions can:
- ā
Respect RLS (if using `auth.uid()` and proper security)
- ā Bypass RLS (if `SECURITY DEFINER` without checks)
- ā Execute arbitrary SQL (if poorly written)
## Risk Levels for Functions
| Type | Risk | Description |
|------|------|-------------|
| `SECURITY INVOKER` | Lower | Runs with caller's permissions |
| `SECURITY DEFINER` | Higher | Runs with definer's permissions |
| Accepts text/json | Higher | Potential for injection |
| Returns setof | Higher | Can return multiple rows |
## Usage
### Basic RPC Audit
```
Audit RPC functions on my Supabase project
```
### Test Specific Function
```
Test the get_user_data RPC function
```
## Output Format
```
āāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāā
RPC FUNCTIONS AUDIT
āāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāā
Project: abc123def.supabase.co
Functions Found: 6
āāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāā
Function Inventory
āāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāā
1. get_user_profile(user_id uuid)
Security: INVOKER
Returns: json
Status: ā
SAFE
Analysis:
āāā Uses auth.uid() for authorization
āāā Returns only caller's own profile
āāā RLS is respected
2. search_posts(query text)
Security: INVOKER
Returns: setof posts
Status: ā
SAFE
Analysis:
āāā Parameterized query (no injection)
āāā RLS filters results
āāā Only returns published posts
3. get_all_users()
Security: DEFINER
Returns: setof users
Status: š“ P0 - RLS BYPASS
Analysis:
āāā SECURITY DEFINER runs as owner
āāā No auth.uid() check inside function
āāā Returns ALL users regardless of caller
āāā Bypasses RLS completely!
Test Result:
POST /rest/v1/rpc/get_all_users
ā Returns 1,247 user records with PII
Immediate Fix:
```sql
-- Add authorization check
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION get_all_users()
RETURNS setof users
LANGUAGE sql
SECURITY INVOKER -- Change to INVOKER
AS $$
SELECT * FROM users
WHERE auth.uid() = id; -- Add RLS-like check
$$;
```
4. admin_delete_user(target_id uuid)
Security: DEFINER
Returns: void
Status: š“ P0 - CRITICAL VULNERABILITY
Analysis:
āāā SECURITY DEFINER with delete capability
āāā No role check (anon can call!)
āāā Can delete any user
āāā No audit trail
Test Result:
POST /rest/v1/rpc/admin_delete_user
Body: {"target_id": "any-uuid"}
ā Function accessible to anon!
Immediate Fix:
```sql
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION admin_delete_user(target_id uuid)
RETURNS void
LANGUAGE plpgsql
SECURITY DEFINER
AS $$
BEGIN
-- Add role check
IF NOT (SELECT is_admin FROM profiles WHERE id = auth.uid()) THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'Unauthorized';
END IF;
DELETE FROM users WHERE id = target_id;
END;
$$;
-- Or better: restrict to authenticated only
REVOKE EXECUTE ON FUNCTION admin_delete_user FROM anon;
```
5. dynamic_query(table_name text, conditions text)
Security: DEFINER
Returns: json
Status: š“ P0 - SQL INJECTION
Analysis:
āāā Accepts raw text parameters
āāā Likely concatenates into query
āāā SQL injection possible
Test Result:
POST /rest/v1/rpc/dynamic_query
Body: {"table_name": "users; DROP TABLE users;--", "conditions": "1=1"}
ā Injection vector confirmed!
Immediate Action:
ā DELETE THIS FUNCTION IMMEDIATELY
```sql
DROP FUNCTION IF EXISTS dynamic_query;
```
Never build queries from user input. Use parameterized queries.
6. calculate_total(order_id uuid)
Security: INVOKER
Returns: numeric
Status: ā
SAFE
Analysis:
āāā UUID parameter (type-safe)
āāā SECURITY INVOKER respects RLS
āāā Only accesses caller's orders
āāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāā
Summary
āāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāā
Total Functions: 6
Safe: 3
P0 Critical: 3
āāā get_all_users (RLS bypass)
āāā admin_delete_user (no auth check)
āāā dynamic_query (SQL injection)
Priority Actions:
1. DELETE dynamic_query function immediately
2. Add auth checks to admin_delete_user
3. Fix get_all_users to respect RLS
āāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāāā
```
## Injection Testing
The skill tests for SQL injection in text/varchar parameters:
### Safe (Parameterized)
```sql
-- ā
Safe: uses parameter placeholder
CREATE FUNCTION search_posts(query text)
RETURNS setof posts
AS $$
SELECT * FROM posts WHERE title ILIKE '%' || query || '%';
$$ LANGUAGE sql;
```
### Vulnerable (Concatenation)
```sql
-- ā Vulnerable: dynamic SQL execution
CREATE FUNCTION dynamic_query(tbl text, cond text)
RETURNS json
AS $$
DECLARE result json;
BEGIN
EXECUTE format('SELECT json_agg(t) FROM %I t WHERE %s', tbl, cond)
INTO result;
RETURN result;
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
```
## Context Output
```json
{
"rpc_audit": {
"timestamp": "2025-01-31T11:00:00Z",
"functions_found": 6,
"summary": {
"safe": 3,
"p0_critical": 3,
"p1_high": 0
},
"findings": [
{
"function": "get_all_users",
"severity": "P0",
"issue": "RLS bypass via SECURITY DEFINER",
"impact": "All user data accessible",
"remediation": "Change to SECURITY INVOKER or add auth checks"
},
{
"function": "dynamic_query",
"severity": "P0",
"issue": "SQL injection vulnerability",
"impact": "Arbitrary SQL execution possible",
"remediation": "Delete function, use parameterized queries"
}
]
}
}
```
## Best Practices for RPC Functions
### 1. Prefer SECURITY INVOKER
```sql
CREATE FUNCTION my_function()
RETURNS ...
SECURITY INVOKER -- Respects RLS
AS $$ ... $$;
```
### 2. Always Check auth.uid()
```sql
CREATE FUNCTION get_my_data()
RETURNS json
AS $$
SELECT json_agg(d) FROM data d
WHERE d.user_id = auth.uid(); -- Always filter by caller
$$ LANGUAGE sql SECURITY INVOKER;
```
### 3. Use REVOKE for Sensitive Functions
```sql
-- Remove anon access
REVOKE EXECUTE ON FUNCTION admin_function FROM anon;
-- Only authenticated users
GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION admin_function TO authenticated;
```
### 4. Avoid Text Parameters for Dynamic Queries
```sql
-- ā Bad
CREATE FUNCTION query(tbl text) ...
-- ā
Good: use specific functions per table
CREATE FUNCTION get_users() ...
CREATE FUNCTION get_posts() ...
```
## MANDATORY: Progressive Context File Updates
ā ļø **This skill MUST update tracking files PROGRESSIVELY during execution, NOT just at the end.**
### Critical Rule: Write As You Go
**DO NOT** batch all writes at the end. Instead:
1. **Before testing each function** ā Log the action to `.sb-pentest-audit.log`
2. **After each function analyzed** ā Immediately update `.sb-pentest-context.json`
3. **After each vulnerability found** ā Log the finding immediately
This ensures that if the skill is interrupted, crashes, or times out, all findings up to that point are preserved.
### Required Actions (Progressive)
1. **Update `.sb-pentest-context.json`** with results:
```json
{
"rpc_audit": {
"timestamp": "...",
"functions_found": 6,
"summary": { "safe": 3, "p0_critical": 3 },
"findings": [ ... ]
}
}
```
2. **Log to `.sb-pentest-audit.log`**:
```
[TIMESTAMP] [supabase-audit-rpc] [START] Auditing RPC functions
[TIMESTAMP] [supabase-audit-rpc] [FINDING] P0: dynamic_query has SQL injection
[TIMESTAMP] [supabase-audit-rpc] [CONTEXT_UPDATED] .sb-pentest-context.json updated
```
3. **If files don't exist**, create them before writing.
**FAILURE TO UPDATE CONTEXT FILES IS NOT ACCEPTABLE.**
## MANDATORY: Evidence Collection
š **Evidence Directory:** `.sb-pentest-evidence/03-api-audit/rpc-tests/`
### Evidence Files to Create
| File | Content |
|------|---------|
| `function-list.json` | All discovered RPC functions |
| `vulnerable-functions/[name].json` | Details for each vulnerable function |
### Evidence Format (Vulnerable Function)
```json
{
"evidence_id": "RPC-001",
"timestamp": "2025-01-31T10:30:00Z",
"category": "api-audit",
"type": "rpc_vulnerability",
"severity": "P0",
"function": "get_all_users",
"analysis": {
"security_definer": true,
"auth_check": false,
"rls_bypass": true
},
"test": {
"request": {
"method": "POST",
"url": "https://abc123def.supabase.co/rest/v1/rpc/get_all_users",
"curl_command": "curl -X POST '$URL/rest/v1/rpc/get_all_users' -H 'apikey: $ANON_KEY' -H 'Content-Type: application/json'"
},
"response": {
"status": 200,
"rows_returned": 1247,
"sample_data": "[REDACTED - contains user PII]"
}
},
"impact": "Bypasses RLS, returns all 1,247 user records",
"remediation": "Change to SECURITY INVOKER or add auth.uid() check"
}
```
### Add to curl-commands.sh
```bash
# === RPC FUNCTION TESTS ===
# Test get_all_users function (P0 if accessible)
curl -X POST "$SUPABASE_URL/rest/v1/rpc/get_all_users" \
-H "apikey: $ANON_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json"
# Test admin_delete_user function
curl -X POST "$SUPABASE_URL/rest/v1/rpc/admin_delete_user" \
-H "apikey: $ANON_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"target_id": "test-uuid"}'
```
## Related Skills
- `supabase-audit-tables-list` ā List exposed tables
- `supabase-audit-rls` ā Test RLS policies
- `supabase-audit-auth-users` ā User enumeration tests
This skill audits PostgreSQL RPC functions exposed through Supabase REST RPC endpoints. It discovers available functions, tests each for RLS bypass, SQL injection, and dangerous DEFINER behavior, and produces prioritized findings with recommended fixes. The skill is designed to save progress continuously so results survive interruptions.
The skill enumerates RPC functions via the Supabase project endpoint and inspects signatures, SECURITY DEFINER/INVOKER flags, parameter types, and return types. It actively tests functions by invoking them (with safe probes) to detect RLS bypass, excessive data exposure, and injection vectors, and it captures request/response evidence. Results and evidence are logged and written incrementally to persistent context and evidence files as each function is tested.
Do I need project credentials to run this audit?
Yes. The Supabase URL and anon key (or service role key for deeper tests) are required to enumerate and invoke RPC endpoints.
What happens if the audit is interrupted?
The skill is built to write logs, context, and evidence progressively for each function so all completed findings are preserved even if execution stops.