home / skills / chrislemke / stoffy / philosophy-of-language
This skill helps you master the philosophy of language, guiding meaning, reference, and speech acts to improve semantic reasoning.
npx playbooks add skill chrislemke/stoffy --skill philosophy-of-languageReview the files below or copy the command above to add this skill to your agents.
---
name: philosophy-of-language
description: "Master philosophy of language - meaning, reference, truth, speech acts. Use for: semantics, pragmatics, meaning theory, reference. Triggers: 'meaning', 'reference', 'Frege', 'sense', 'Kripke', 'speech act', 'semantics', 'pragmatics', 'truth conditions', 'propositions', 'names', 'descriptions', 'rigid designator', 'natural kind', 'context', 'indexical'."
---
# Philosophy of Language Skill
Master the philosophical study of language: How do words mean? How does reference work? What is truth?
## Core Questions
| Question | Issue |
|----------|-------|
| How do words mean? | Theory of meaning |
| How do names refer? | Reference theory |
| What is truth? | Truth theories |
| What do we do with words? | Speech act theory |
---
## Theories of Meaning
### Frege: Sense and Reference
```
FREGEAN SEMANTICS
═════════════════
REFERENCE (Bedeutung)
├── What expression picks out
├── "Venus" refers to Venus
└── Compositional: Reference of whole from parts
SENSE (Sinn)
├── Mode of presentation
├── Cognitive significance
├── "Morning star" vs. "Evening star"
└── Same reference, different sense
WHY BOTH?
├── "Hesperus = Phosphorus" is informative
├── "Hesperus = Hesperus" is trivial
├── Same reference, different sense
└── Sense determines reference
```
### Russell: Descriptions
**The Problem**: "The present King of France is bald"
- No King of France exists
- What does the sentence mean?
**Russell's Analysis**:
```
"The F is G" =
∃x(Fx ∧ ∀y(Fy → y=x) ∧ Gx)
"There is exactly one F, and it is G"
Not a referring expression but a quantified claim
False (not meaningless) because no unique F exists
```
### Direct Reference
**Kripke's Revolution**:
- Names are rigid designators
- Refer to same thing in all possible worlds
- Not abbreviated descriptions
```
KRIPKE'S ARGUMENTS
══════════════════
MODAL ARGUMENT:
"Aristotle might not have been a philosopher"
├── Makes sense
├── But "The teacher of Alexander might not have taught Alexander"
│ └── Would make Aristotle not Aristotle
└── Names ≠ descriptions
EPISTEMIC ARGUMENT:
We can discover "Hesperus = Phosphorus"
├── A posteriori necessary truth
├── Same thing in all worlds
└── But discovered, not known a priori
SEMANTIC ARGUMENT:
Reference is causal-historical
├── Not by fitting description
├── Baptism + chain of communication
└── Name-using practice
```
---
## Meaning and Use
### Wittgenstein: Meaning as Use
**Early**: Meaning is picturing reality
**Later**: "Meaning is use in a language game"
**Language Games**:
- Meaning depends on context, rules, practice
- No single essence to "meaning"
- Family resemblance
**Private Language Argument**:
- No purely private meanings
- Rule-following requires community
- Meaning is public
### Speech Act Theory (Austin, Searle)
```
SPEECH ACT THEORY
═════════════════
THREE TYPES OF ACTS:
LOCUTIONARY
├── Saying something with meaning
└── Uttering words with sense and reference
ILLOCUTIONARY
├── What you do in saying it
├── Promising, warning, asserting
└── Force of the utterance
PERLOCUTIONARY
├── Effect on hearer
├── Persuading, frightening, amusing
└── Consequences of saying
FELICITY CONDITIONS:
├── Preparatory: Appropriate circumstances
├── Sincerity: Speaker means it
├── Essential: Counts as the act
└── Infelicity: Act fails (not false, but unhappy)
```
---
## Reference and Names
### Descriptivist Theory
**Frege/Russell**: Names = disguised descriptions
- "Aristotle" = "The teacher of Alexander" (or cluster)
- Reference determined by satisfying description
**Problems** (Kripke):
- Modal: Could have failed to satisfy description
- Epistemic: Can discover identity
- Semantic: Reference even with false beliefs
### Causal-Historical Theory
**Kripke/Putnam**:
- Initial baptism fixes reference
- Reference transmitted through causal chain
- Community-based reference
### Natural Kind Terms
**Putnam's Twin Earth**:
```
TWIN EARTH
══════════
Scenario:
├── Twin Earth exactly like Earth
├── Except "water" is XYZ, not H₂O
├── XYZ phenomenally identical to H₂O
└── 1750: No one knows difference
Question: Does "water" mean the same?
Putnam: No!
├── "Water" on Earth refers to H₂O
├── "Water" on Twin Earth refers to XYZ
├── "Meanings ain't in the head"
└── Natural kind terms refer to natural kinds
```
---
## Truth
### Correspondence Theory
- Truth = correspondence to facts
- "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white
- Problems: What are facts? What is correspondence?
### Coherence Theory
- Truth = coherence with other beliefs
- System of beliefs that hangs together
- Problems: Coherent fictions?
### Pragmatic Theory
- Truth = what works
- Useful beliefs are true
- Problems: Useful ≠ true
### Deflationism
- "True" is just a device for endorsement
- "Snow is white" is true = Snow is white
- No substantial property
### Tarski's Semantic Theory
```
TARSKIAN TRUTH
══════════════
T-SCHEMA:
"S" is true iff S
EXAMPLE:
"Snow is white" is true iff snow is white
Requirements:
├── Object language (mentioned)
├── Metalanguage (used)
├── Hierarchy avoids liar paradox
└── Truth defined for formal languages
```
---
## Context and Indexicals
### Indexicals
- "I", "here", "now", "this"
- Reference depends on context of utterance
- Kaplan: Character vs. Content
```
KAPLAN'S THEORY
═══════════════
CHARACTER
├── Rule for determining reference
├── "I" = speaker of context
└── Constant across contexts
CONTENT
├── What's said in context
├── "I am tired" said by me
└── Proposition about me
```
### Contextualism
- Meaning of many expressions context-dependent
- Not just indexicals
- "Knows", "tall", "ready"
---
## Key Vocabulary
| Term | Meaning |
|------|---------|
| Sense | Mode of presentation |
| Reference | What expression picks out |
| Rigid designator | Same reference in all worlds |
| Indexical | Context-dependent expression |
| Proposition | What is said, content |
| Speech act | Action performed in speaking |
| Illocutionary force | Type of speech act |
| Compositionality | Meaning of whole from parts |
| Use theory | Meaning is use |
| Direct reference | Names refer without sense |
---
## Integration with Repository
### Related Skills
- `analytic-philosophy`: Core tradition
- `logic`: Formal semantics
### Related Themes
- `thoughts/knowledge/`: Language and thought
This skill helps you master core issues in the philosophy of language: meaning, reference, truth, and speech acts. It surveys major theories (Frege, Russell, Kripke, Wittgenstein, Austin/Searle, Putnam, Tarski) and links them to practical problems in semantics and pragmatics. Use it to clarify concepts, compare accounts, and apply theory to concrete linguistic examples.
The skill explains what linguistic expressions pick out (reference) and how they convey content (sense, propositions, truth conditions). It inspects competing analyses: descriptivist and causal-historical accounts of names, Fregean sense, Russellian descriptions, and direct-reference approaches. It also covers use-based and speech-act perspectives, plus formal tools like Tarski's semantic schema and Kaplan's indexical framework.
Do names always refer by description?
Not necessarily. Descriptivist accounts treat names as shorthand for descriptions, but causal-historical and direct-reference theories argue names are rigid designators fixed by baptism and transmitted socially.
When should I use Tarski's approach?
Use Tarski's semantic theory for formal languages or when you need a precise truth-definition that avoids paradox via language hierarchies. It's less directly applicable to natural-language vagueness and context sensitivity.